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Science, Ethics and Observation1  
James Lenman 
 
This is my version of a paper published in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 
Volume 72, Phenomenology and Naturalism, erd. Havi Carel and Darian Meacham, 
July 2013, pp 261 ± 274. Please refer to the published version when quoting or citing.  
 
,Q5LFKDUG%R\G¶VFODVVLF manifesto for what came to be known as Cornell Realism, 
his HVVD\³+RZWREHD0RUDO5HDOLVW´ we find this striking passage. 
 
Of the challenges to moral realism we are considering, two are 
straightforwardly epistemological. They suggest that the role of moral 
intuitions and of reflective equilibrium dictate (at best) a constructivist 
interpretation of morals. As we saw in section 4.2, it would be possible for the 
moral realist to respond by assimilating the role of moral intuitions and theory 
to the role of scientific intuitions and theory-dependent methodological factors 
in the realist account of scientific knowledge, but this response is viable only 
if it is possible to portray many of our background moral beliefs and 
judgments as relevantly approximately true and only if there is a satisfactory 
DQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³:KDWSOD\VLQPRUDOUHDVRQLQJWKHUROHSOD\HGLQ
VFLHQFHE\REVHUYDWLRQ"´/HWXVWXUQILUVWWRWKHODWWHUTXHVWLRQ 
 
,SURSRVHWKHDQVZHUµ2EVHUYDWLRQ´2 
 
But more on that story later.  
 
Cornell Realism is after all quite old news now. A bit 1980s. Now, as the new century 
lurches towards its difficult teens, the latest thing is experimental ethics. After 
centuries of lack of real progress in moral philosophy, our understanding of ethics is 
in the course of being transformed by new insights from experimental psychology and 
neurology. Or so it is widely believed and asserted. This has produced some 
interesting interdisciplinary possibilities. Perhaps indeed too, some interesting anti-
disciplinary possibilities. For I think it is fair to say that some of the brasher and more 
confident experimentalists conceive the future relationship between empirical science 
and traditional moral philosophy less in terms of a partnership and more along the 
lines of a take over bid. The days of arid armchair theorizing are at an end. Ethics is 
off to the lab.  
 
Of course there is a tradition in philosophy that thinks this simply cannot be right and 
WKDWLVWKHWUDGLWLRQFRPSULVLQJWKRVHZKRDUHLPSUHVVHGE\+XPH¶VIDPRXV
REVHUYDWLRQVDERXWWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RILQIHUULQJDQµRXJKW¶IURPDQµLV¶DQGWKHE\
arguments against naturalism aired by such philosophical luminaries as G.E. Moore 
and R. M. Hare. The new experimentalist¶s standard complaint is that these arguments 
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are fallacious. Rather than concern myself here with adding to the oceans of ink 
already spilt adjudicating that issue, I shall approach the fray from a somewhat 
different direction. 
 
I want to focus for now on a recent addition to the more popular and polemical side of 
WKHH[SHULPHQWDOLVWOLWHUDWXUH6DP+DUULV¶VUHFHQWERRNThe Moral Landscape: How 
Science Can Determine Human Values. Note the subtitle: how science can determine 
values. Not influence. Not inform. Harris is very much a take-over bid man. Like 
Boyd, he is out to defend a pretty robust for of naturalistic moral realism. Moral 
questions have answers, he claims, and it is an empirical matter, a matter for science, 
what those answers are.  
 
A take-over bid man then. Indeed, he makes it clear, philosophy is not his favourite 
subject: 
 
,DPFRQYLQFHGWKDWHYHU\DSSHDUDQFHRIWHUPVOLNH³PHWDHWKLFV´
³GHRQWRORJ\´³QRQFRJQLWLYLVP´³DQWLUHDOLVP´³HPRWLYLVP´HWFGLUHFWO\
increases the amount of boredom in the universe.3  
 
I do not quote this to an audience composed mostly of philosophers so we can be 
offended by it or so that we can sneer knowingly. It is actually perfectly true that a 
vast amount of modern moral philosophy is breathtakingly boring. But no less true 
that all of it is not. These things are a matter of taste but surely anyone who is bored 
by the ± largely jargon-free - writings of, say, Judith Thomson or Robert Nozick or 
Bernard Williams must surely be someone who is simply not interested in the subject 
at all, from whatever disciplinary perspective. And while it is true that there is also a 
lot of boring literature out there, reading a certain amount even of boring literature, in 
philosophy as elsewhere, is a price we sometimes have to pay for knowing what we 
are talking about. 
 
+DUULV¶VHYLGHQW contempt for moral philosophy may account for the often imperfect 
knowledge of it that is often on display. Perhaps the most egregious example comes 
right up front on pZKHUHKHWHOOVXVWKDW³7KHJRDORIWKLVERRNLVWREHJLQD
FRQYHUVDWLRQDERXWKRZPRUDOWUXWKFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVFLHQFH´
This is of course a very odd claim indeed. Begin a conversation? Really? For of 
course the conversation, and a very lively conversation it has been, about how moral 
truth can be understood in the context of science has being going on now for a very 
long time and Harris has joined it at a very late point. 
 
+DUULV¶VGLP view of moral philosophy is puzzling for a further reason. He wants to 
claim that ethics is entirely a matter of empirical science and in particular of 
neuroscience and he himself is a neuroscientist by training. But in fact there is not 
very much neuroscience in this book and rather a lot of what can only be described as 
moral philosophy.  
 
$FHQWUDOSKLORVRSKLFDODJHQGDRI+DUULV¶VLVDGHIHQFHRIXWLOLWDULDQLVP+HWKLQNV
there are answers to moral questions and he thinks those answers are all about human 
wellbeing. The arguments he deploys are familiar though he shows little sign of 
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recognition that they have a history. Thus he follows Mill4  in urging repeatedly that 
apparent conflicts between a utilitarian conception of morality and other important 
values can be largely mitigated by insisting on an understanding of human well being 
that it is sufficiently rich and deep. And he follows Ross5 and others in his heavy 
reliance on the kind of comparative thought experiments where we seek to illuminate 
the intuitive intrinsic value of well being by comparing in our imagination a world 
where everyone is happy with a world where everybody is miserable. Though of 
course the latter thought experiment can at most establish that well being is at least 
one of the things that we should value, a conclusion that falls some way short of 
utilitarianism, and the continued application of the same comparative method, in the 
hands of Ross himself, took that far more careful philosopher some way beyond it. . 
 
In deploying such arguments Harris is appealing constantly to moral intuition. He is 
SHUIHFWO\XSIURQWDERXWWKLV³:KLOHPRUDOUHDOLVPDQGFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVPKDYHERWK
come under pressure in philosophical circles, they have the virtue of corresponding to 
PDQ\RIRXULQWXLWLRQVDERXWKRZWKHZRUOGZRUNV´6 However he dRHVQ¶WKDYHPXFK
to tell us about how he thinks intuition itself works. He tells us on p. 36 that just as we 
all have an intuitive physics, much of which rigorous scientific investigation has 
shown us is wrong, likewise we have each an intuitive morality much of which is, 
once again, clearly wrong. But his utilitarianism is clearly grounded in appeal to 
intuitions in which he clearly does repose some trust, inviting the question, How does 
he think he is able sort the wheat from the chaff?  
 
7DONRI³LQWXLWLRQVDERXWKRZWKHZRUOGZRUNV´VRXQGVOLNH+DUULVKDVLQPLQG
something more robustly substantive than the linguistic intuitions at play in 
conceptual analysis. But at least much of the time he talks as if something along the 
latter lines is just what he thinks he is up to. To contest utilitarianism is, he claims, to 
³PLVXVHZRUGV´7 Well-EHLQJLV³WKHRQO\LQWHOOLJLEOHEDVLV´IRUPRUDOLW\8 
'LVFRQQHFWHGIURPH[SHULHQFHWDONRIYDOXHLV³HPSW\´9 The connection between 
what is interesting and the experience of conscious beings, and that between 
importance and well-EHLQJKROG³E\GHILQLWLRQ´10 0RVWVWULNLQJRIDOOLV+DUULV¶V
short skirmish with the open question argument: 
 
,IZHGHILQH³JRRG´DVWKDWZKLFKVXSSRUWVZHOO-being, as I will argue we 
must, the UHJUHVVLQLWLDWHGE\0RRUH¶V³RSHQTXHVWLRQDUJXPHQW´UHDOO\GRHV
stop. While I agree with Moore that it is reasonable to wonder whether 
PD[LPL]LQJSOHDVXUHLQDQ\JLYHQLQVWDQFHLV³JRRG´LWPDNHVQRVHQVHDWDOO
to ask whether maximizing well-being is JRRG´,WVHHPVFOHDUWKDWZKDWZH
are really asking when we wonder whether a certain state of pleasure is 
³JRRG´LVZKHWKHULWLVFRQGXFLYHWRRUREVWUXFWLYHRIVRPHGHHSHUIRUPRI
well-EHLQJ´11 
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Such passages might suggest we are engaged in a form of conceptual analysis and the 
basic intuitions at play are linguistic. But that would be misleading. For Harris 
happily allows that it is quite open to people with different goals and different moral 
FRPPLWPHQWVWRGHILQHWKHVHZRUGVLQGLIIHUHQWZD\V³,PLght claim that morality is 
really about maximizing well-EHLQJ«EXWVRPHRQHHOVHZLOOEHIUHHWRVD\WKDW
morality depends upon worshipping the gods of the Aztecs´12. The Aztec has his 
definition, reflecting his goals, we have ours and we might doubt if ours has any 
VSHFLDOSULYLOHJH:HPLJKWLQGHHGVD\V+DUULV³,VLWSRVVLEOHWRYRLFHVXFKGRXEWVLQ
KXPDQVSHHFK"<HV%XWWKDWGRHVQ¶WPHDQZHVKRXOGWDNHWKHPVHULRXVO\´13 
 
So it looks as if it is not, after all, an issue quite about intelligibility. We define the 
concepts one way given our goals. Strange and alien creatures might define them 
differently given theirs. We can understand what they do but we should not take it 
seriously. What is the force of this claim? Here Harris simply seems to baulk. To 
press further at this point would be an absurd and unreasonable demand for what he 
calls radical justification. Here he presses certain analogies. Health is the goal of 
medicine and it itself we define in terms of certain goals, longevity, freedom from 
pain and so on. Questioning or justifying these goals is really no business of medicine. 
Science likewise is defined, he says, with reference to certain a certain goal, that of 
understanding the universe. It is not a scientific issue whether this goal is correct or 
MXVWLILHGEXWWKDWLVQRWDUHDVRQWRTXHVWLRQLWRUWDNHVHULRXVO\ULYDOJRDOV³:HPLJKW
observe that standard science is better at predicting the behaviour of matter than 
&UHDWLRQLVW³VFLHQFH´LV%XWZKDWFRXOGZHVD\WRD³VFLHQWLVW´ZKRVHRQO\goal is to 
authenticate the Word of God? Here we seem to reach an impasse. And yet no one 
thinks that the failure of standard science to silence all possible dissent has any 
VLJQLILFDQFHZKDWVRHYHUZK\VKRXOGZHGHPDQGPRUHRIDVFLHQFHRIPRUDOLW\"´14 
 
As DFDVHIRUDUREXVWO\QDWXUDOLVWLFYHUVLRQRIPRUDOUHDOLVPWKLVDLQ¶WIDEXORXVO\
impressive. You know what? If Dr Crazy want to redefine the practice of medicine 
not in terms of its traditional goal of promoting health, but in terms of a new goal of 
maximizing the number of cancer cells in the world, nobody will take him seriously. 
2IFRXUVHQRW%XWWRH[SODLQWKDWZHGRQ¶WQHHGWRVXSSRVHWKDWWKHUHDUHREMHFWLYH
moral truths that underwrite our goals and our definition and not his. It is enough that 
our goals are ours and his are not ours. Then all we need is simple instrumental 
UHDVRQLQJ*LYHQWKDWRXUJRDOLVKHDOWKOHW¶VHQFRXUDJHHYHU\RQHWRHDWWKHLUJUHHQV
And of course doing that is simply doing medicine. Or if Professor Crazy wants to 
abandon science devoted to understanding the universe and redeploy all the resources 
currently devoted to that to some other goal, again we will recoil. Why will we do so? 
Because we are curious creatures and we really care about understanding the universe, 
we ignore Professor Crazy and get on with our science. But in doing that we need not 
rely on any supposition that our goals find an echo in some normative reality that his 
do not. Once again they motivate us as his do not because they are ours and his are 
not.  
 
But now suppose this. Suppose we have somehow settled that utilitarianism is true. 
Suppose, in other words, we have simply finished doing normative ethics. We have 
arrived at the end of inquiry in a shared and stable state of reflective equilibrium and 
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the utilitarians have won. We know that all that matters is determining what particular 
actions, what general policies will best promote well being. That kind of inquiry will 
not look much like moral philosophy. It will be simple scientific inquiry perhaps of 
familiar kinds. I would guess some of it will look very like, will in fact be, economics. 
Some of it will be medicine. According to Harris an awful lot of it will be 
neuroscience. Ethics, the investigation of what is good and right, if we feel like 
calling these successor inquiries ethics, will be then be thoroughly naturalized.  
 
My hunch is that Harris thinks that that is really where we are. Of course there are 
loads of people out there who are not utilitarians and the argument continues between 
the utilitarian likes of Peter Singer and the nonconsequentialist likes of Frances 
.DPP%XWWKHVRFLRORJLFDOIDFWWKDWDQDUJXPHQWLVVWLOOJRLQJRQQHHGQ¶WVKRZWKDWLW
LVQ¶WLQDQLPSRUWDQWVHQVHRYHUDIWHUDOO+DUULVLVSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKWKHFRQIOLFW
between science and religion so it may be apt to compare the dispute between young 
Earth creationists who believe all living species came into being separately in distinct 
acts of creation around six thousand years ago and those who believe we are the 
product of an epic process of branching evolutionary development from a common 
ancestry over many millions of years. Sociologically, we might say, that argument is 
still going on. There are plenty of voices still raised on both sides. But really it is over. 
The creationist case has been defeated. Like the ghosts in the film, these guys just 
GRQ¶WNQRZWKH\¶UHGHDG7KH\ZRQ¶WVKXWXS but most of us feel abundantly 
warranted in not taking them seriously. Perhaps that is true of the debate between 
creationists and Darwinists. Perhaps it is true too of other debates though it is surely a 
diagnosis to be made with a certain cautious reluctance.  
  
My hunch is that Harris thinks just this to be true of the debate between utilitarians 
and their opponents. I suspect he thinks, as many do, that for anyone with a 
naturalistic mindset, anyone imbued with the scientific spirit, the truth of 
utilitarianism is just a no-brainer, that all rival views are simply hang-overs from our 
atavistic superstitious past, irrational nonsense we should simply grow up and shrug 
off.  
 
It is striking that Harris is happy to embrace the move that is sometimes aired by way 
of an intended reductio of moral naturalism. If a thoroughgoing naturalism is true why 
not simply abandon moral concepts that seem to speak of a distinctive domain of 
moral properties and simply speak in overtly naturalistic terms of the natural 
properties with which we have identified them.15 Why not indeed, asks Harris? 
 
:KDWZRXOGLWEHOLNHLIZHFHDVHGWRZRUU\DERXW³ULJKW´DQG³ZURQJ´RU
³JRRG´DQG³HYLO´DQGVLPSO\DFWHGVRDVWRPD[LPL]HZHOO-being, our own 
and that of others? Would we lose anything important? And, if important, 
ZRXOGQ¶WLWEHE\GHILQLWLRQ>there he goes again!], a matter RIVRPHRQH¶V
well-being?16  
 
Fair enough, on his terms. The fundamental point of normative concepts, as I have 
argued elsewhere17, is to negotiate conflict, intra-and interpersonal, over practical 
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 See e.g. Parfit 2011, chapters 24-,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJKHUHWRFRPSDUH3DUILW¶Vµ+DUG1DWXUDOLVW¶ZLWK
WKHµFRQVLVWHQWQDWXUDOLVW¶RI3ULRU 
16
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matters, conflict over what to do. And if we found ourselves in a position where the 
normative arguments were just over, where we all agreed on what our practical 
priorites ought to be, we could give up normative thinking altogether, drop such 
ZRUGVDV³RXJKW´IURPRXUODQJXDJHDQGMXVWJHWRQZLWKWKHVHULRXVEXVLQHVVRI
pursuing the good under the guidance of our best science. That much is fair enough. 
The only problem of course is that it is in fact just a fantasy that that is where we are. 
Or anywhere like where we are. And nothing Harris has to say in this book amounts 
to any kind of case to suppose otherwise. 
 
7KDW¶VPHGRQHZLWK+DUULV$QG,¶PUHDG\WRUHWXUQWRP\original text from Boyd. 
%R\GUHPHPEHULVFRQFHUQHGWKDWKLVPRUDOUHDOLVPZKLFKGHSHQGVRQ³DVVLPLODWLQJ
the role of moral intuitions and theory to the role of scientific intuiWLRQVDQGWKHRU\´LV
only going to work if there is a satisfactory answer to the question, What plays in 
moral reasoning the role played in science by observation? Boyd thinks this question 
does have a satisfactory answer and that that answer is: observation. This is a bold 
and interesting claim.  
 
It is worth taking a bit of time to be clear why Boyd should suppose obtaining this 
satisfactory answer is so important. He is concerned with assimilating the role of 
intuitions and theory in the moral and scientific cases. Take intuition. Many people of 
course would say that a controlling role analogous to that of observation in science is 
played in moral reasoning not by observation but by intuition itself. Only of course 
those people tend not to be naturalistic moral realists and the puzzle they face is 
explaining just how that is supposed to work. Boyd, on the other hand, thinks 
intuitions play a role in moral reasoning akin to the role they, intuitions, play in 
science. And he thinks they do play a role there. But intuitions in science do not play 
a grounding role of the sort they are supposed to in ethics by those who think they 
furnish us with non-inferential a priori knowledge. A distinguished and experienced 
professor of chemistry may have intuitions, hunches, about chemistry. Presented with 
novel chemical hypotheses, some will strike him as plausible, others as less so. I too 
might have such hunches and so might a paleolithic hunter gatherer. But the 
SURIHVVRU¶VKXQFKHVDUHZRUWKDYHU\JUHDWGHDOPRUHWKDQ mine and perhaps mine are 
worth a bit more than my stone age ancestors. What makes the difference is scientific 
training and experience. Judgements of theoretical plausibility, made by a trained 
mind, are, Boyd urges, evidential. But they are not a priori and they are not 
noninferential. Rather they are based on years of scientific education and experience 
even though the inferential routes by which they are reached are not themselves 
transparent to the expert subject. Based as they are on scientific training they can be 
taken seriously and have a role to play in the direction of scientific thought. But for 
this to be true the theoretical knowledge that underlies them needs to enjoy a 
sufficient measure of confirmation to be regarded as probably and approximately true. 
18
 And the ideas to which they lead us, cannot rest for ever on this intuitive support, 
but must themselves seek confirmation. So it is only because observation is playing 
the controlling role it does in confirmation that intuition can legitimately play the role 
it does in theory construction. So if moral intuitions are to share a vindication with 
scientific intuitions, something, and not just further intuition has to be playing the 
VDPHFRQWUROOLQJUROH+HQFH%R\G¶VTXHVWLRQ 
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At this point I had better say a bit more DERXW%R\G¶Vcomplex and subtle view. As 
well as drawing here on his 1988 paper I draw also on its continued development in 
papers published in in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2003, ³Finite 
Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist 
Consequentialism3DUW,´3DUW,,LVOHVVUHOHYDQWWRP\SUHVHQWFRQFHUQV As the 
latter titles imply Boyd is a consequentialist. He is also a welfarist and hence, like 
Harris, a utilitarian. His own name for his view is homeostatic consequentialism, 
hereafter HC. According to HC the word µJRRG¶GHQRWHVDFRPSOH[FOXVWHURIQDWXUDO
properties relating to the satisfaction of human needs where the clustering in question 
is a product of homeostasis, i.e., very roughly, each of the properties in question tend 
to be favourable WRWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHRWKHUVµ*RRGQHVV¶ so understood is a natural 
kind term in viUWXHRIWKLVFOXVWHUSURSHUW\¶VFDXVDOUROH:KDWPDNHVWKLVVWXII in 
particular goodness is that is plays a regulative causal role in our theoretical practice 
with the concept of goodness in a way that explains the success of that practice, much 
as is the case with more familiar scientific natural kind terms. This is an a posteriori 
matter, not a matter of conceptual analysis. For the participants in the practice can 
themselves be mistaken about what they accomplish and how. By appealing to this 
possibility, we can avoid a worry for simpler forms of analytic naturalism of finding 
ourselves committed to saying that those who hold different moral outlooks are 
simply talking past each other. On the contrary such disputing parties are all talking 
about goodness in just the way in which people who disagree about the chemical 
constitution of water are all talking about H2O.  
 
%R\G¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPHWKRORJ\RIPRUDOWKHRUL]LQJLVPRUHRUOHVV
conventional. He thinks the core method is the method of reflective equilibrium as 
canonically described by John Rawls and Norman Daniels. Naturally reflective 
equilibrium is wide, drawing not just on considerations native to ethics, but on science 
and the rest of philosophy. As Boyd notes, this might seem an unsatisfactory position 
for a rigorous naturalist to take. Surely reflective equilibrium is too presupposition-
laden to be a method of discovery and is more at home in a metaethical theory of a 
PRUHPRGHVW³FRQVWUXFWLYLVW´UHVSRQVH-dependent sort? But Boyd thinks this concern 
can be tamed. Again he thinks there need be no difference with the practice of science 
where our theoretical practice is heavily theory-dependent. In science, this is OK 
because we have warrant to be confident in the approximate truth of our best current 
theories, a warrant that derives from the theoretical and practical success of scientific 
theorizing through its history.  
 
Boyd stresses that our reliance on reflective equilibrium is far from entailing that our 
ethical knowledge is not genuinely experimental. Political and social history is a 
FHQWUDOVRXUFHRIGDWD7KXVHJZHXQGHUVWDQG³WKHGLPHQVLRQVRIRXUQHHGVIRU
artistic expression´ because there have been cultures with the leisure to explore them 
And the development of early democracies helps us understand ³the role of political 
democracy in the homeostatis of the good´.19 But this whole picture again requires 
that we are able to say what plays the role in moral reasoning that observation plays in 
science. And to this question, as we hDYHVHHQ%R\G¶VDQVZHULVObservation. After 
all goodness as understood by homeostatic consequentialism is a natural property, out 
in plain view, no less observable than any other.  
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But there are problems here. Boyd himself thinks we can vindicate his realist 
understanding of moral inquiry, along lines he takes to be analogous to the case of 
science, by seeing moral terms as referring to whatever candidate moral properties 
best explain the success of moral discourse in achieving its aims.20 But it is just not at 
all clear that the parallel is convincing, that we really have in moral inquiry a narrative 
of achievement relevantly comparable to what we can point to in science. A lot has 
happened to be sure in the way of social and cultural change and some of what has 
happened has been shaped for better or worse by the work of moral theorists broadly 
construed (French philosophes, English philosophical radicals, etc.) that perhaps 
clarified, focused and developed our central moral ideas. But plausibly nothing of a 
kind to make constructivist and other anti-realist understandings of ethics look simply 
quixotic in the way that like understandings of the causal order of physical nature look 
simply quixotic.  
 
Moreover, what is to count as success or as progress in the ethical case is surely so 
thoroughly theory-dependent (and in ways it is surely far from obvious are closely 
paralleled in the case of science) that a debilitating circularity threatens. Suppose we 
found ourselves in possession of a Tardis and a Babel Fish (i.e. for those innocent of 
popular science fiction of a time travel device and a universal translation device) and 
were thus in a position to invite Plato and Aristotle to tea. Anxious to impress them 
with the wonders of modern science we tell them about light bulbs, motor cars, atom 
bombs, aeroplanes, film, TV, space travel, computers, the possibilities of modern 
medicine. Golly, we might expect them to say, You guys must be onto something. 
There has to be something in all that physics, chemistry and stuff you believe. How 
else could you have accomplished all this astonishing stuff? And of course their 
warrant for being impressed is very theory-independent. To be impressed with a 
VFLHQWLILFFXOWXUHWKDWKDVPDVWHUHGDLUWUDYHO\RXGRQ¶WQHHGWRNQRZPuch 
mechanics, only enough to know that mastering air travel is hard, and Plato and 
Aristotle, for all their deep ignorance of modern mechanics, sure knew that much. But 
now we turn to the case of ethics. We tell them how slavery has ceased to be a 
morally acceptable practice and, while not quite rooted out, is at least illegal more or 
less everywhere. We tell them how democracy has grown and spread and developed 
and opposition to it has come to be more and more morally disreputable. But we 
might not then expect Aristotle, who rather approved of slavery, to be much 
impressed and we might expect Plato, who positively deplored democracy, to be 
postively appalled. As our moral thought has evolved we have come to disapprove of 
slavery and celebrate democracy and our moral practice has roughly kept in step. Our 
history might have been different. We might have come to like slavery more and more 
and to deplore democracy. If in consequence, slavery and autocracy had come to be 
ever more widespread, we would look back on our history as one of steady moral 
progress but that would hardly be the sort of vindication Boyd is after. This heavily 
theory-dependent standard of success in this context surely strips it of the capacity to 
do any confirmatory heavy-lifting. More or less any evolution in our moral outlook is 
apt to look, ex post, like progress.21  
                                                 
20
 Ibid., esp. pp 125-128.; 2003, esp. pp. 515±19. 
21
 Here my critique of Boyd is helpfully viewed as continuous, in its concern with independence, with 
Nick =DQJZLOO¶VRI%R\G¶VIHOORZ&RUQHOOUHDOLVWV1LFKRODV Sturgeon and David Brink, and 
their contention that moral naturalism draws support from the ability of moral judgements, when 
conjoined with auxiliary hypotheses, to have observable consequences. This, they maintain, shows that 
moral judgements are regular empirical judgements subject to empirical confirmation. Moral 
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Boyd allows that what is to count as an achievement is indicated, albeit defeasibly, by 
the judgements of expert practitioners.22 Certainly if we privilege contemporary 
experts this will lead us to favour the optimistic reading of history where our present 
disapproval of slavery is evidence of progress. And Boyd seems relaxed about this, 
happy to characterize the very aims of moral inquiry in practical, substantively moral 
terms. I too tend to be relaxed about this but this relaxation flows in large measure 
from my being what Boyd would consider a kind of constructivist. It is not so clear 
that a more robust realist than I can so credibly relax.  
 
Here Boyd strikes a rather modest note, suggesting we may see ethical theory as in the 
business of offering, in effect, K\SRWKHWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHVµ7KHRULHVRIWKHQDWXUHVRI
WKHJRRGHWFKDYH«MXVWWKHVDPHK\SRWKHWLFDOQRUPDWLYHLPSRUWDVGRRXUWKHRULHV
of the natures of chemical NLQGV³,I\RXZDQWWRDFKLHYHWKHDLPVRIPRUDOSUDFWLFH
classify things this way.´´23 No doubt there could be many such classificatory 
schemes corresponding to many competing putative such aims. The question then is 
whether the choice of aim Boyd would favour can be said to be correct where 
µcorrectness¶ is to be understood in the sort of robustly naturalistic realist spirit that 
ZRXOGEHFRQVRQDQWZLWK%R\G¶Vmetaethical theorizing more generally.   
 
Intriguingly, these ethical various schemes, on BoyG¶VDFFRXQWPD\FRPHWRVHHP
strikingly akin to the systems of thick concepts possessed by unreflective 
µK\SHUWUDGLWLRQDO¶VRFLHWLHVDVFRQFHLYHGE\Bernard Williams (1985, pp. 142ff.), 
descriptive concepts with an evaluative  significance rendered highly stable and 
determine through never being challenged or contested. Williams allows that the 
application of such concepts can yield real knowledge but distinguishes such 
knowledge sharply from anything that would address the reflective questions that 
arise when we stand back from these determinate conceptual structures and attempt to 
evaluate them and determine which furnish the best form of human life. But this 
reflective enterprise²about which Williams is somewhat pessimistic²is an essential 
and far from completed aspect of moral inquiry. And this is the part of moral inquiry 
where appeals to intuition appear to play the most pervasive and troublingly central 
roleDUROHLWQRORQJHUVHHPVFDQEHZDUUDQWHGLQ%R\G¶VIDYRXUHGZD\E\JURXQGLQJ
it in the success of the practice that has informed it, for this is the part of moral 
inquiry whose very subject matter is what we are to count as such success.  
 
The difficulty here LVERUQHRXWE\%R\G¶VUDWKHUGHIODWLRQDU\WDNHRQWKHµFULWLFDO
VWDQFH¶WKDW5REHUW$Gams (1999, pp. 77±82) has alleged his naturalism is ill-suited to 
DFFRPPRGDWH%R\G¶VOHQJWK\GLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVREMHFWLRn concludes by suggesting a 
GLYLVLRQRIODERXUEHWZHHQµLQYHVWLJDWLRQVRIWKHPHWDSK\VLFVRIPRUDOV¶²of which 
his naturalist metaethics are an account²and an in principle distinct process whereby 
ZHµVDWLVI\RXUVHOYHVWKDWWKHUHIHUHQWVRI³JRRG´DQGVLPLODUO\DSSUREDWLYHPRUDO
WHUPVDUHWKLQJVZHDFWXDOO\DGPLUH¶ 24 +HGRHVQ¶WWHOOXVYHU\PXFKDERXWWKLVODWWHU
                                                                                                                                            
judgements can indeed, Zangwill concedes, pass this test, but so too does all manner of garbage. 
However moral judgements, he goes on to urge, do not pass the stronger and more discriminating test 
that Ian Hacking, Philip Kitcher and Peter Kosso have proposed, that the evidence for the auxiliary 
hypothesis be adequately independent of the judgement it is proposed to test.  
22
 Boyd 2003, pp. 543-544. 
23
 Ibid.,, p. 545 
24
 Ibid.,, pp. 545-6. 
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process but this robustly naturalistic characterization of it seems to align him rather 
more, where it is concerned, with the kind of constructivist approach he seeks in other 
contexts to abjure. 
 
8OWLPDWHO\WKHQP\SUREOHPZLWK%R\G¶VQDWXUDOLVPLVFRQWLQXRXVwith my problem 
with the far less nuanced and thoughtful naturalism on offer from Harris. The practice 
of moral reflection may lead us to believe that goodness is realized by some natural 
property NG and rightness by some natural property NR. NG might, what Boyd 
thinks it is, be a homeostatic bundle of properties relevant to human needs. It might be 
what Moore thought it, experiences of aesthetic beauty and close interpersonal 
friendship, or what Bentham thought it, simply pleasure. It might be something else. 
But once we have satisfied ourselves of it being whatever it is, it is then the business 
of the various human sciences to tell us how to put this moral understanding into 
SUDFWLFHZKDWWKLQJVKDYH1*ZKDWDFWLRQVDQGSROLFLHVKDYH152QFHZH¶YHVR
satisfied ourselves, everything else is empirical. But the process of getting there, 
which I take it is the distinctive métier of moral philosophers, is something else, 
something empirical investigation centrally regulated by scientific observation should 
be expected to constrain and inform but cannot be expected to settle.  
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